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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                     
 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
   Petitioner-appellant Vance was convicted of murder in 
the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas.  In this habeas corpus 
proceeding, he collaterally attacks the validity of his 
conviction on the ground that he did not receive the "Assistance 
of Counsel for his defence" as mandated by the Sixth Amendment. 
The license of Vance's lawyer to practice law in Pennsylvania was 
"revoked" shortly after the conclusion of his representation of 
Vance because he had made material misrepresentations of fact on 
his application for admission to the Pennsylvania Bar.  The 
district court declined to grant relief, and for the reasons that 
follow, we will affirm. 
 
I. 
 Russell Vance was charged with the murder and 
involuntary manslaughter of his landlord, as well as with robbery 
and possession of an instrument of crime.  Vance engaged the 
services of Lewis Small, Esquire, to represent him in connection 
with these charges.  Small turned the matter over to an associate 
in his office, Richard Potack, Esquire, who was ultimately 
appointed by the court to represent Vance on April 15, 1985. 
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 After a two day suppression hearing and other pretrial 
proceedings, a jury was selected in early February of 1986. After 
opening arguments and the calling of the first witness, Vance 
decided to enter a plea of guilty to the murder charge. The court 
then conducted a three day degree of guilt hearing, found Vance 
guilty of murder in the first degree, and sentenced him to life 
imprisonment.   
 Several days later, Vance filed a pro se motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea, and subsequently, he submitted an 
amended motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.  A new 
attorney was appointed to represent Vance, and the court held an 
evidentiary hearing.  Ultimately, it vacated Vance's sentence and 
granted his motion to withdraw his plea.  The Commonwealth 
appealed.  The Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed and 
reinstated the judgment of sentence, Commonwealth v. Vance, 546 
A.2d 632 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).  Vance filed a Petition for 
Allowance of Appeal to the Supreme Court which was denied. 
Commonwealth v. Vance, 557 A.2d 723 (Pa. 1989).  After an 
unsuccessful post-conviction relief proceeding in the state 
courts, Vance filed this federal habeas proceeding. 
 The record reveals a number of facts about Vance's 
counsel of which Vance and the trial judge were unaware at the 
time of trial.  Potack graduated from Howard University School of 
Law in May of 1975 and passed the California Bar Examination that 
summer.  He was admitted to the California Bar in December of 
1975 and practiced law in that state for the next eight years. 
His practice included criminal defense representations. 
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 Potack began using cocaine regularly in 1980.  Between 
mid-1981 and the fall of 1983, former clients filed at least ten 
complaints against him with the California disciplinary 
authorities.  In November of 1983, while these matters were under 
investigation, Potack voluntarily ceased practicing law in 
California, and in December, moved to Philadelphia.   
 Potack successfully took the Pennsylvania Bar 
examination in February of 1984 and was admitted to that bar in 
May.  On his application for permission to take the bar 
examination, he falsely represented that no charges for 
professional misconduct were presently pending against him, that 
no such charges had been filed in the past, and that he had not 
undergone treatment for the use of drugs.  In addition, he 
represented that he had not been arrested or prosecuted for any 
crime when he knew there were outstanding warrants for his arrest 
for passing worthless checks in California.   
 Two weeks after he began his representation of Vance, 
Potack entered a stipulation with the California disciplinary 
authorities regarding the professional misconduct complaints 
against him.  He stipulated that while he was an attorney, he had 
(1) withdrawn from employment without refunding unearned fees 
paid in advance in four cases; (2) represented clients with 
conflicting interest without obtaining the consent of all 
concerned parties; (3) failed to use reasonable diligence and his 
best judgment for the purpose for which he was employed in four 
cases; and (4) failed to deposit funds received on behalf of a 
client in a separate, identifiable bank account.  On June 21, 
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1985, the disciplinary authorities recommended to the California 
Supreme Court that Potack be suspended from the practice of law 
for three years, that the suspension be stayed, and that he be 
placed on probation on the conditions that he serve a one year 
suspension, make restitution, pass the professional 
responsibility examination, and participate in a drug 
rehabilitation program.  The record does not disclose the date 
upon which Potack's suspension in California commenced. 
 On January 13, 1986, approximately three weeks before 
the jury was selected for Vance's trial, the Pennsylvania State 
Board of Law Examiners petitioned the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
to revoke Potack's admission to the bar.  The Board's petition 
alleged that if it had known of Potack's failure to truthfully 
answer questions inquiring into professional and criminal 
misconduct and narcotics abuse, it would not have given him 
permission to sit for the Pennsylvania Bar Exam and would have 
found that he did not meet the Board's character standards to 
practice law.  The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted the 
Board's "Petition to Revoke Admission to the Bar" on April 16, 
1986.  
 When Vance's trial judge vacated his sentence and 
permitted him to withdraw his guilty plea, she acted in part 
based on her view that the April 16, 1986 order of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court had the "effect of making [Potack's] 
membership in the Pennsylvania Bar void ab initio."  App. 44D. 
Citing People v. Washington, 384 N.Y.S.2d 691 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1976), for the proposition that the term "counsel" in the Sixth 
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Amendment referred to "a duly licensed lawyer and nothing less," 
id. at 692, she held that Vance had not received the 
constitutionally required assistance of counsel for his defense. 
App. 44D, 52D. 
 The Superior Court took a different view of the 
predicate state law issue.  It rejected the view that Potack's 
membership in the Pennsylvania Bar had been void ab initio. 
Commonwealth v. Vance, 546 A.2d at 636.  Accordingly, it held 
that "[a]t the time Mr. Potack represented [Vance], he was a 
member of the Pennsylvania Bar" and authorized by Pennsylvania 
law to conduct Vance's defense.  Id. at 635. 
 
II. 
 Vance's federal habeas corpus petition does not seek 
relief on the ground that Potack did or failed to do something 
during his representation of Vance that breached his professional 
responsibilities in a way that prejudiced the defense of the 
case.  Vance's brief before us tacitly recognizes that the record 
will not support a contention that he is entitled to a new trial 
under the standard announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668 (1984); the record does not affirmatively show that 
counsel's performance was deficient and that this deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense.  Rather, Vance presses the 
theory accepted by the Court of Common Pleas:  the representation 
by Potack was a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment without 
regard to the quality of his performance. 
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 We begin our analysis of Vance's contentions with the 
basic principles underlying right to counsel jurisprudence.   
The right to the effective assistance of 
counsel is . . . the right of the accused to 
require the prosecution's case to survive the 
crucible of meaningful adversarial testing. 
When a true adversarial criminal trial has 
been conducted -- even if defense counsel may 
have made demonstrable errors -- the kind of 
testing envisioned by the Sixth Amendment has 
occurred. 
 
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984) (footnote 
omitted).  Accordingly, "[a]bsent some effect of challenged 
conduct on the reliability of the trial process, the Sixth 
Amendment guarantee is generally not implicated."  Id. at 658. 
Nevertheless, as Vance stresses, there are "circumstances that 
are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of 
litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified." Id.   
 The circumstances in which prejudice has been found so 
likely as to be presumed are very rare.  The Court in Cronic set 
forth a few examples that illustrate the degree of risk of 
prejudice that must be present before its demonstration is 
excused.  If the defendant has no representation of any kind, his 
conviction is per se invalid.  Id. at 659.  The same is true if, 
for any reason, the defendant's counsel is prevented from 
assisting him during a critical stage of the proceeding.  Id. 
"Similarly, if counsel entirely fails to subject the 
prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing [by 
foregoing cross-examination of the prosecutor's witnesses], then 
there has been a denial of the Sixth Amendment rights that makes 
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the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable."  Id. 
(citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974)).   
 Another situation which would warrant the application 
of a per se rule finding a violation of the Sixth Amendment is 
where the defendant is represented by someone with little or no 
legal training who is masquerading as an attorney.  See Harrison 
v. United States, 387 F.2d 203, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ("layman 
masquerading as a qualified attorney" cannot provide assistance 
of counsel), rev'd on other grounds, 392 U.S. 219 (1968); People 
v. Felder, 391 N.E.2d 1274, 1275 (N.Y. 1979) (assistance of 
counsel denied where legal representative was not a member of the 
bar and had not completed law school);   Cf. United States v. 
Wilhelm, 570 F.2d 461, 465 (3d Cir. 1978) ("Counsel" within the 
meaning of the Sixth Amendment contemplates one with professional 
qualifications, not lay persons).  While Vance acknowledges that 
there is a difference between such an imposter and one in 
Potack's position, he insists that the likelihood of prejudice to 
his case was sufficiently great to warrant the same result. 
 The courts have consistently looked to the licensing 
authorities of the legal profession to determine in circumstances 
of this kind the boundaries of the per se exception to the 
Strickland rule.  If a lawyer is authorized by those authorities 
to practice law, his or her performance on a criminal defendant's 
behalf is acceptable for Sixth Amendment purposes so long as the 
Strickland criteria are not met.  See Reese v. Peters, 926 F.2d 
668, 670 (7th Cir. 1991) ("The constitutional question is whether 
the court has satisfied itself of the advocate's competence and 
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authorized him to practice law."); Bellamy v. Cogdell, 974 F.2d 
302, 306-07 (2d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (per se rule only applied 
where lawyer is not licensed or where there is conflict of 
interest), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1383 (1993).  See also United 
States v. Stevens, 978 F.2d 565, 568 (10th Cir. 1992) (lawyer 
disbarred from federal court but not from state court provides 
assistance of counsel in federal trial); United States v. 
Hoffman, 733 F.2d 596 (9th Cir.) (representation in federal court 
by one suspended from practice by state bar not equivalent to 
representation by one who has never been qualified to practice in 
any jurisdiction), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1039 (1984).  On the 
other hand, with exceptions for licensing defects unrelated to a 
person's competence to practice law,1 the courts have generally 
viewed representation by someone not authorized to practice law 
as a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment.  Reese, 926 F.2d 
668; United States v. Novak, 903 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1990); United 
States v. Mouzin, 785 F.2d 682, 697 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 
U.S. 985 (1986); Solina v. United States, 709 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 
1983); People v. Felder, 391 N.E.2d 1274 (N.Y. 1979); Huckelbury 
v. State, 337 So.2d 400 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976). 
                                                           
1
  E.g., Reese v. Peters, 926 F.2d 668 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(suspension for failure to pay bar dues); United States v. 
Costanzo, 740 F.2d 251 (3d Cir. 1984) (failure to be admitted pro 
hac vice), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1017 (1985); Wilson v. People, 
652 P.2d 595 (Colo. 1982) (representative met substantive 
requirements but failed to take the formal oath for membership in 
the bar), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1218 (1983); Ex parte Engle, 418 
S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967) (representation begun before 
formal admission to bar took place).  But see McKenzie v. Ellis, 
287 F.2d 549, 551 (5th Cir. 1961) (representation by attorney who 
failed to pay state bar dues and was therefore not authorized to 
practice constituted violation of due process). 
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 In this case, Pennsylvania's intermediate appellate 
court has held that under Pennsylvania law, Potack was authorized 
to practice before the courts of that state at the time he 
represented Vance.  Pennsylvania's highest court has declined to 
review that decision and Vance has pointed to nothing suggesting 
that that court would reach a different result were it to 
consider the issue.  Under these circumstances, we accept the 
holding of the Superior Court as the law of Pennsylvania.  See 
West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 236-237 (1940). 
 Vance acknowledges that Sixth Amendment jurisprudence 
has traditionally looked to the licensing authorities of the 
legal profession to set the boundaries of the per se violation 
rule.  He insists, however, that Potack's state-conferred 
authority should not control here for two reasons.  First, Vance 
points to the allegation of the Board's petition that it would 
not have recommended his admission to the Pennsylvania Bar had it 
known that he had lied on his application.  Second, he asserts 
that Potack was laboring under a conflict of interest during his 
representation of Vance.  Neither of these arguments persuades us 
that the risks of prejudice to Vance were sufficient to warrant 
application of the per se rule.  Moreover, we believe that 
application of the per se exception in circumstances of this kind 
would impose an intolerable burden on trial courts and create an 
intolerable degree of uncertainty about the finality of criminal 
judgments. 
 Potack was far from an untrained imposter.  He was a 
graduate of an accredited law school, he had been certified by 
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the California Bar authorities as competent to practice law in a 
process untainted by misrepresentation, he had practiced law for 
over a decade, and he had been tested and found knowledgeable 
about Pennsylvania practice and procedure.  The only thing that 
distinguished him from the majority of attorneys who represent 
defendants day in and day out in our criminal justice system was 
that he had been guilty of prior, but unrelated, breaches of his 
professional responsibility.  
 As Vance stresses, during the representation, Potack 
had stipulated to having breached his professional responsibility 
to several former California clients and stood accused of having 
lied on his Pennsylvania Bar Exam application.  These were 
serious breaches of professional ethics.  They cannot be, and 
have not been, condoned.  At the same time, experience has taught 
that lawyers, like other human beings, occasionally fall from 
grace.  This is an unfortunate fact of life and is, of course, 
one of the principal reasons why the legal profession has 
disciplinary systems.  Our courts have traditionally relied upon 
these systems to adjudicate and evaluate alleged professional 
defalcations.  As a result, where breaches of professional 
responsibility are unrelated to the representation of the 
defendant, courts have not regarded the imposition of sanctions 
as relevant to the adequacy of an attorney's representation and 
have not given disbarment orders retroactive effect for Sixth 
Amendment purposes.  United States v. Mouzin, 785 F.2d 682, 698 
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 985 (1986).  In those 
instances where lawyers have been sanctioned or disbarred for 
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conduct predating but unrelated to a criminal representation, the 
risk to the defendant has not been considered sufficient to 
warrant application of the per se rule.  Waterhouse v. Rodriguez, 
848 F.2d 375, 383 (2d Cir. 1988) (disbarment of defendant's 
counsel during pretrial suppression hearing did not result in 
denial of defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel where attorney was member of bar when 
hearing began and ceased representation immediately after 
learning of disbarment); Mouzin, 785 F.2d at 698 (disbarment from 
court of appeals for conduct unrelated to ongoing representation 
in district court does not render such representation 
ineffective); Roach v. Martin, 757 F.2d 1463, 1479-80 (4th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985) (state bar authorities' 
investigation of lead counsel during trial did not warrant 
presumption of prejudice); Hoffman, 733 F.2d at 602 (attorney's 
suspension from practice by his home state bar during federal 
district court trial not cause for per se finding of 
ineffectiveness); United States v. Sielaff, 542 F.2d 377, 380 
(7th Cir. 1976) (subsequent disbarment of petitioner's counsel 
"was irrelevant to his performance at petitioner's trial"); 
Hernandez v. Wainwright, 634 F. Supp. 241, 246 (S.D. Fla. 1986) 
(trial counsel's disbarment five years after defendant's 
conviction was not sufficient to find that counsel had rendered 
ineffective assistance at trial absent showing of direct nexus 
with prejudice at trial), aff'd, 813 F.2d 409 (11th Cir. 1987). 
 If courts were to accept the rule for which Vance 
contends, trial judges would no longer be able to rely on the 
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existence of de jure authority to practice law.  Their only 
recourse would be to conduct an in-depth inquiry into the moral 
character of defense counsel in each and every case.  Given the 
difficulty of marshalling the relevant information, even then, 
they would have little assurance that the particular criminal 
case before them could be tried to an unimpeachable judgment. 
 We find this case readily distinguishable from United 
States v. Novak, 903 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1990), upon which Vance 
principally relies.  In Novak, the defendant had been represented 
by a person who had fraudulently gained admission to the New York 
Bar by applying for an exemption from the bar exam requirement 
which was intended for those whose legal studies were interrupted 
by military service and for which he was ineligible.  The court 
found a per se Sixth Amendment violation.  Because defense 
counsel had never been validly licensed to practice in any state 
and, thus, "[h]is competence to practice law had never been 
tested," the court found the situation there to be like that of 
an imposter.  Novak, 903 F.2d at 890.  In this case, Potack had 
been admitted to practice in California and had demonstrated his 
mastery of Pennsylvania law and practice.  While he had 
previously engaged in professional misconduct unrelated to 
Vance's case, that does not cause us to question what seems 
readily apparent from a review of the record -- Potack exposed 
the government's case to "the crucible of meaningful adversarial 
testing."  Cronic, 466 U.S. at 656. 
 Nor does Vance's allegation of a conflict of interest 
undermine our confidence in the integrity of the proceedings 
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before the Court of Common Pleas.  Vance suggests that Potack's 
self-interest conflicted with Vance's interest in mounting a 
vigorous and aggressive defense.  His theory is that Potack may 
have refrained from conducting such a defense for fear of 
prompting an investigation into his (Potack's) background. 
 Vance is correct in pointing out that some conflicts of 
interest have been found to justify invocation of the per se 
violation rule.  "Prejudice is presumed," however, "only if the 
defendant demonstrates that counsel 'actively represented 
conflicting interests' and that 'an actual conflict of interest 
adversely affected his lawyer's performance.'"  Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 692 (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 350 
(1980)) (emphasis supplied).  More specifically, the defendant 
must identify something that counsel chose to do or not do, as to 
which he had conflicting duties, and must show that the course 
taken was influenced by that conflict.  See Burger v. Kemp, 483 
U.S. 776 (1987); United States v. Gambino, 788 F.2d 938 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825 (1986).  If the defendant 
carries this burden, the requisite degree of risk of prejudice is 
established and the defendant does not have to demonstrate that 
the result of his trial would have been different absent the 
conflict.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 (citing Cuyler v. 
Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 349-50). 
 In the cases relied upon by Vance, Novak and Solina, 
counsel was not properly licensed to practice law.  Accordingly, 
the representation of the defendant was itself a crime -- i.e., 
the unauthorized practice of law.  In these circumstances, a 
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vigorous and successful defense of the client might well 
influence the exercise of the prosecutor's discretion in the 
future should the absence of a license subsequently come to 
light.  Novak, 903 F.2d at 890; Solina, 709 F.2d at 164.  While 
we are not certain that the defendants in these cases satisfied 
the criteria set forth by the Supreme Court in its conflicts of 
interest jurisprudence, we can understand the concerns that led 
these courts to the result reached.2 
 Courts have reached a different result, however, where 
a conflict of interest has been alleged involving an attorney who 
was authorized to practice law, but was the subject of a 
professional misconduct investigation.  In these circumstances, 
the courts have been unwilling to find a per se violation based 
on the theory that the defense of the criminal case would be 
prejudiced by the attorney's desire not to alienate the 
prosecutor or the court.  See Waterhouse, 848 F.2d at 383 
(attorney had no reason to fear that vigorous defense would 
expose him to unrelated charges of misappropriation of client 
                                                           
2
  This court had a similar concern in United States v. DeFalco, 
644 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1979), which involved a similar, but more 
egregious, conflict.  There we applied the per se violation rule 
in a case where the defendant's lawyer, while litigating the 
defendant's appeal, had been indicted and pleaded guilty in the 
same district court the defendant had been convicted in and had 
negotiated a plea bargain for himself with the same United States 
Attorney's Office that had tried the defendant's case.  We were 
concerned about the direct conflict between counsel's duty to 
persuade the appellate court of error in the defendant's trial 
proceedings and his self-interest in not alienating the 
prosecutor with whom he was negotiating and the court by which he 
would be sentenced.  Our holding there was a narrow one, 
expressly limited to these facts, and is not implicated here. Id. 
at 136-37. 
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funds); Mouzin, 785 F.2d at 699 (attorney's disbarment from 
appellate court, without more, does not place attorney into 
adversarial position with defendant being tried in district 
court); Roach, 757 F.2d at 1479-80 (conflict of interest should 
not be presumed absent showing that investigation into attorney's 
conduct by licensing authorities simultaneously with attorney's 
representation of defendant impaired attorney's ability to defend 
client); Hoffman, 733 F.2d at 602 (attorney's suspension from his 
home state bar and his failure to inform federal district judge 
did not place him "in an adversarial position relative to" the 
defendant).  Where, as here, the professional misconduct charge 
and the criminal defense are wholly unrelated, nothing done or 
foregone in the criminal defense can effect the result in the 
ethics proceedings and we perceive no actual conflict between the 
lawyer and his client.  If anything, we believe a lawyer under 
fire for past misconduct is likely to be highly motivated to give 
the best professional representation possible.  Waterhouse, 848 
F.2d at 383.  
 In this case, Potack was authorized to practice law and 
his representation of Vance was not a crime.  Accordingly, he had 
no fear of subsequently being the subject of a judgment by 
Pennsylvania's prosecuting authorities.  Moreover, the petition 
to revoke Potack's license was filed well before Vance's trial 
began and his plea was entered.  The facts concerning Potack's 
past were thus already known to the Pennsylvania courts and 
disciplinary authorities before these critical phases of the 
proceeding.  Even with respect to the earlier part of the 
17 
representation, however, we perceive no actual conflict.  We 
believe a lawyer who wishes to minimize his chances of coming to 
the attention of the disciplinary authorities has every reason to 
render the best possible professional representation. 
 
III. 
 Vance's lawyer had previously violated his professional 
responsibilities on a number of occasions.  Those violations were 
unrelated to Vance's defense, however, and the record does not 
suggest any similar defalcation here.  To the contrary, the 
record indicates that Potack rendered a professionally competent 
and vigorous performance.  While it is, of course, possible that 
Potack did not live up to his professional responsibilities to 
Vance in some way unreflected in the record, the potential for 
prejudice to Vance under the circumstances of this case is not 
sufficiently great to place this case in the same category with 
the cases that have applied a per se rule.  The judgment of the 
district court will be affirmed.  
